Criticism
Volume 56 | Issue 4

2014

Habits of Modernism
Kate J. Stanley
Western University, kate.stanley@uwo.ca

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism
Recommended Citation
Stanley, Kate J. (2014) "Habits of Modernism," Criticism: Vol. 56: Iss. 4, Article 9.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism/vol56/iss4/9

Article 9

Habits of
Modernism
Kate Stanley
Pragmatic Modernism by Lisi
Schoenbach. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011. Pp. 224.
$45.00 cloth.

What does it mean to practice pragmatic literary criticism?1 For the
majority of the twentieth century,
there appeared to be little overlap
between pragmatic and literary
lines of inquiry. In the 1950s, at a
moment when pragmatism was
being heralded as “almost the official philosophy of America,” New
Criticism’s open hostility towards
pragmatist thinking restricted
its influence on literary studies.2
With the rise of deconstruction
and post-structuralism, pragmatism remained relegated to the sidelines of literary study. By the 1980s,
however, pragmatist thought began
to gain traction in literature departments in America. An important
catalyst for a literary turn towards
pragmatism was Richard Rorty’s
influential challenge to representationalist theories of language
and perception in Philosophy and
the Mirror of Nature (1979). Rather
than a mirror that reflects and clarifies reality, language is for Rorty
the radically contingent core of all
experience. His contention that linguistic redescription can remake the
world has resonated strongly with
critics invested in the idea that literary language not only illuminates,
but also potentially transforms,
conditions of living.
Rorty has been called “the foremost proponent of American pragmatist thought,” though his own
professed preference is to be characterized “as someone who tried
to retrieve some stuff in Dewey
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that . . . was in danger of being
forgotten.” And yet, in Rorty’s
estimation, this project of retrieval
has little to offer people studying
literature.3 His contention would
seem to be confirmed by the dearth
of literary critics who have looked
to John Dewey as a guiding figure,
even as pragmatism’s significance
for the study of literature has been
established over the past thirty
years.4 Lisi Schoenbach’s declaration that Dewey is “the unassuming philosophical hero” of her book
Pragmatic Modernism (2012) serves
as a welcome corrective to Rorty’s
dismissal and to Dewey’s wider
neglect in literary studies (10).
Like Rorty, Schoenbach credits John Dewey with pioneering
a “recontextualizing mode” of
investigation into sudden or novel
encounters (13). In Rorty’s interpretation, the term recontextualization
describes the way we accommodate
small and large-scale paradigm
shifts by reweaving our “webs of
beliefs and desires” in response to
change. On one end of the spectrum
are the “routine calculations” that
allow us to assimilate minor alterations into the social fabric of daily
life. At the other end of the continuum are dramatic transformations
like those spurred by “revolutionary
science or politics.”5 While Rorty’s
discussion of recontextualization
focuses on the history of Western
philosophy, Schoenbach unexpectedly finds Dewey’s recontextualizing logic powerfully at work in

literary modernism. Her suggestion that figures like Henry James
and Gertrude Stein took a recontextualizing approach to modern
change counters a long tradition
of modernist literary criticism that
relies on what she calls “the ideology of the break.” “To this day,”
Schoenbach argues, “modernism
continues to be defined by its celebration of heroic opposition, its
clean break from the past, its antiinstitutional stand, and its emphasis
on shock and radical discontinuity”
(4). As she shows, the dominant
narrative of “modernism-as-break”
frequently occludes an equally
strong modernist investment in
more gradual and continuous processes of incorporating change into
the framework of experience (3).
For the pragmatic modernist, a
moment of radical rupture cannot
be understood in isolation from
its animating and resulting conditions. As each of the writers and
thinkers of Schoenbach’s study
recognizes, violent upheaval catalyzes sustainable social change and
meaningful aesthetic innovation
only to the extent that those transformations are integrated into an
ongoing praxis of life.
The critical term at the center of
Schoenbach’s study—habit—may
seem like an unlikely source of common ground between modernism
and pragmatism. Habit’s embattled
status in avant-garde aesthetics is
exemplified by modernist manifestoes that call for the demolition of

On Pragmatic Modernism
all routines, conventions, and traditions that stultify the mind. Viktor Shklovsky’s famous polemic in
favor of an art of defamiliarization
underwrites a widespread commitment to countering the deadening force of “habitualization” (6).
From this vantage, William James
and John Dewey’s dedication to
cultivating sustainable life habits
may be construed as a final brick
on the wall dividing pragmatism’s
staid practicality from modernism’s
revolutionary radicalism. Schoenbach deftly reconstrues habit as the
very crack that fissures the integrity of this false partition. As she
demonstrates, pragmatist habit is
irreducible to the numbing repetition that Shklovsky and others hold
up as the chief enemy of art. James
and Dewey teach us that habit is
an ever-evolving organism, subject
to Darwin’s evolutionary information like all other forms of life.6 In
fact, as Joan Richardson has demonstrated, the founders of pragmatism set out to cultivate “habits of
mind” that would provide the supportive scaffolding necessary for
facing the Darwinian insight that
we are “accidental creatures inhabiting a universe of chance.”7 Recognizing the potential for habits
to harden into rote reflexes, James
and Dewey emphasize the vital
importance of exercising habits
into flexible responsiveness. Those
writers whom Schoenbach claims
as pragmatic modernists approach
the task of writing and reading as
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their primary means of fostering
receptively supple habits of perception and expression.
Pragmatist and modernist aesthetics converge where we might
least expect. As Schoenbach uncovers, the most vehement avant-garde
rejections of “pragmatic considerations” in the name of “total revolt”
hinge in each case on equally robust
accounts of the habitual rhythms
that shape everyday life.8 For
example, André Breton populates
Nadja’s (1928) dreamscapes with
strange, defamiliarized objects. In
Schoenbach’s reading, the novel
reanimates these relics of past habits by weaving them through the
novel’s imaginative loom. Surrealist strategies like automatic writing
and dream analysis discover the
phantasmagoric potential of quotidian objects through techniques
of “total integration,” as Walter
Benjamin describes them.9 Benjamin’s term underlines for Schoenbach that even avant-garde ideals
of revolutionary rupture depend on
ongoing, integrative aesthetic practices and life habits. Though they
focus on the proliferating shocks of
modernity, both Breton and Benjamin share a core goal with pragmatists like Dewey and James: to
supplant repetitive, mindless forms
of automatism with fresh forms of
consciousness. In Schoenbach’s persuasive account, surrealist shock—
and a wider avant-garde allegiance
to rupture—is deeply rooted in the
ground of habit.
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While Pragmatic Modernism
theorizes habit by way of Dewey
and William James, the chapters
on Stein and Henry James demonstrate the term’s critical breadth
and aesthetic richness. Stein’s conception of habit in particular has
served as a linchpin for recent studies that connect cultural theories of
everyday life with modernism. For
example, Bryony Randall argues
that an overwhelming critical
emphasis on the exceptional, epiphanic modernist moment occludes
alternate models of time exemplified by the domestic “dailiness” of
Stein’s accretive repetitions.10 By
contrast, Liesl Olson sharply critiques Stein’s “dangerously escapist” withdrawal into the routines
of bourgeois domesticity during
Germany’s occupation of France.11
Schoenbach reframes the relationship between domestic culture and
national culture in Stein’s work
by establishing how her writerly
experimentation indexes the individual and institutional habits that
structure personal as well as collective registers of experience. Far
from representing a retreat from
matters of war and statehood,
Stein’s efforts to render habit visible
at the level of grammar and syntax
expose the intimate implication of
daily minutiae, national consciousness, and international politics.
Stein’s attention to the public
implications of private habits introduces Pragmatic Modernism’s second

key term: institutions. For Schoenbach, institutions are broadly construed as the psychic and social
structures “that govern and codify
collective behavior” (68). Part 2
focuses on a range of works by
Henry James that explore the
civic and legal, local and national
dimensions of institutional structures that mediate the individual’s
relationship to the law and to the
state. Often misread as an apolitical aesthete, James at first appears
an unlikely subject for an extended
examination of the institutional
bases of juridical and state power.
However, in recasting James’s protagonists as “a pragmatist ideal of
mindfulness with regard to habit,”
Schoenbach also reframes the
Jamesian stream of experience as
an osmotic flow between individual
and collective forms of consciousness (69). James’s vessels of consciousness—the exquisitely attuned
Milly Theale, Isabel Archer, and
Lambert Strether—navigate the
strange tributaries where apparently personal proclivities, dispositions, and desires intermingle with
impersonal institutional forms.
According to Schoenbach, James’s
keen attention to the “bristling”
points of contact between private
relations and faceless social systems
begins to fill what Dewey describes
as a theoretical vacuum created by
discourses of individualism that
emerged in the eighteenth century
(71). Dewey’s central claim in The
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Public and its Problems (1927) is that
“the documents of the French Revolution . . . at one stroke did away
with all forms of association, leaving, in theory, the bare individual
face to face with that state.”12 In
Schoenbach’s analysis, novels like
The Portrait of a Lady (1881) and
The Princess Casamassima (1886)
offer crucial insights into the various ways that individual freedoms
are constrained but also produced
by institutions like boarding
schools, prisons, political factions,
bureaucratic bodies, and the codified social customs they promote.
With equal sensitivity to the texture of daily minutiae and a wider
social grain, the Jamesian perceiver
confronts a question at the heart
of modernism and at the center of
Schoenbach’s study: How does one
continually reinvigorate processes
of thinking, feeling, and perceiving
when every facet of experience is
conditioned by habits and institutions? Recognizing the impossibility of living free from habit, Isabel,
Milly, Strether, and others develop
what Schoenbach terms “the habit
of freedom”—a posture of responsive openness towards life’s uncertainties (71). Freedom in this context
entails exposure to the risks intrinsic to an unknown future. Schoenbach identifies the central drama of
James’s novels of consciousness as a
confrontation between those characters who embrace unsettlement
and incalculability and those who
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are driven by predictive calculation
and control. Characters like Gilbert Osmond and Madame Merle,
Kate Croy, and Merton Densher
exhibit the “habits of anticipation”
that Schoenbach aligns with the
“prediction theory” Oliver Wendell Holmes develops in his 1897
essay “The Path of Law” (112). A
modern “culture of prediction,” as
Schoenbach defines it, represents
a risk-averse response to the indeterminacies of the modern world
(101). Even as James dramatizes the
ethical limits of manipulating outcomes, the impulse to manage risk
can no more be condemned than
the institutional infrastructure of
the modern world can be dismantled. James’s novels acknowledge
the challenge of facing a future
without guarantees at the same
time that they expand the horizons
of the unknown.
In the chapter on prediction and throughout her study,
Schoenbach resists drawing stark
critical antitheses; a hard and fast
dichotomy between the predictive principles of administrative
control and the ideals of human
freedom would only reinforce the
oppositional logic of modernismas-break that she works to undo.
Instead of opposing prediction
and autonomy, shock and habit,
Schoenbach declares the oscillation between those registers of
experience to be “the signal experience of modernity” (38). While
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Schoenbach’s integrative approach
may appear solely applicable to
the American tradition that is her
primary focus, the final chapter of
Pragmatic Modernism extends the
transatlantic reach of the project.
These last pages develop the provocative claim that Marcel Proust’s
modernism is also distinctly pragmatist. Schoenbach marshals biographical evidence for Proust’s
engagement with pragmatic philosophy, but she finds the most
compelling evidence of Proust’s
pragmatist inquiry in several setpiece scenes of À la recherche du
temps perdu (In Search of Lost Time,
1871–1922). The novel’s famous
opening sequence, for example,
introduces habit as both enabler
and enemy of fresh perception.
As Recherche proceeds, individual
habits accumulate to form collective habits, prompting Proust’s
reflections on social institutions
as dual sources of stultification
and creative inspiration. Schoenbach observes important affinities
between American and European
literary responses to modernity by
aligning Proustian habit with the
work of Stein, the Jameses, and
Dewey. Schoenbach’s transatlantic
expansion of the “recontextualizing vision” they share allies her
study with the ongoing efforts
of Ross Posnock, David Kadlec,
Giles Gunn, George Hutchinson,
and others to establish pragmatism’s international significance
(146).13

Pragmatic Modernism develops
an alternate literary and intellectual genealogy of modernism, but
in allowing her subject to dictate
her method, Schoenbach also models a new set of critical habits. Just
as the pragmatic modernist asks
what difference writing makes
to the way we live, the pragmatic
critic attends to the literary work’s
effects on experience. Schoenbach’s recontextualizing vision
offers fresh insight into modernist conceptions of psychic and
social change, but this study’s most
important contribution is not limited to any one field. Schoenbach
closes by widening the geographic
boundaries of her study, but she
also might have expanded its temporal scope beyond the modernist
period by claiming the methodological importance of pragmatist
habit. As William James defines it,
pragmatism is a “method” that provides an “attitude of orientation”
for inhabiting a pluralistic universe
of chance—a project that remains
as pressing and challenging at the
beginning of the twenty-first century as it did one hundred years
ago.14 The work of the pragmatist
critic, which Schoenbach performs
without overtly announcing, is to
demonstrate the difference that
habits of mind and styles of experience make in maintaining an
“original relation to the universe.”15
In the dexterous hands of such a
critic, the literature of pragmatic
modernism yields instruments for
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living that speak to our present
moment as forcefully as they spoke
their own.
Kate Stanley is assistant professor at the
University of Western Ontario. Her first
book project is tentatively titled “The Practice of Surprise from Emerson to Cage.”
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